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Abstract
We consider information theoretic secret key agreement and secure function computation by multiple
parties observing correlated data, with access to an interactive public communication channel. Our main
result is an upper bound on the secret key length, which is derived using a reduction of binary hypothesis
testing to multiparty secret key agreement. Building on this basic result, we derive new converses for
multiparty secret key agreement. Furthermore, we derive converse results for the oblivious transfer
problem and the bit commitment problem by relating them to secret key agreement. Finally, we derive
a necessary condition for the feasibility of secure computation by trusted parties that seek to compute
a function of their collective data, using an interactive public communication that by itself does not
give away the value of the function. In many cases, we strengthen and improve upon previously known
converse bounds. Our results are single-shot and use only the given joint distribution of the correlated
observations. For the case when the correlated observations consist of independent and identically
distributed (in time) sequences, we derive strong versions of previously known converses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic cryptography relies on the availability of correlated random observations to the
parties. Neither multiparty secret key (SK) agreement nor secure computation is feasible if the observation
of the parties are mutually independent. In fact, SK agreement is not feasible even when the observations
are independent across some partition of the set of parties1. As an extension of this principle, we can
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1With restricted interpretations of feasibility, these observations appear across the vast literature on SK agreement and secure
computation; see, for instance, [44], [1], [16], [60], [40], [80], [48].
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2expect that the efficiency of a cryptographic primitive is related to “how far” the joint distribution of the
observations is from a distribution that renders the observations independent (across some partition of
the set of parties). We formalize this heuristic principle and leverage it to bound the efficiency of using
correlated sources to implement SK agreement and secure computation. We present single-shot converse
results; in particular, we do not assume that the observations of parties consist of long sequences generated
by an independent and identically distributed (IID) random process2.
In multiparty SK agreement, a set of parties observing correlated random variables (RVs) seek to
agree on shared random bits that remain concealed from an eavesdropper with access to a correlated
side information. The parties may communicate with each other over a noiseless public channel, but the
transmitted communication will be available to the eavesdropper. The main tool for deriving our converse
results is a reduction argument that relates multiparty SK agreement to binary hypothesis testing3. For
an illustration of our main idea, consider the two party case when the eavesdropper observes only the
communication between the legitimate parties and does not observe any additional side information.
Clearly, if the observations of the legitimate parties are independent, a SK cannot be generated. We
upper bound the length of SKs that can be generated in terms of “how far” is the joint distribution of the
observations of the parties from a distribution that renders their observations independent. Specifically,
for this special case, we show that the maximum length Sǫ (X1,X2) of a SK (for a given secrecy index
ǫ) is bounded above as
Sǫ (X1,X2) ≤ − log βǫ+η
(
PX1X2 ,PX1 × PX2
)
+ 2 log(1/η),
where βǫ
(
PX1X2 ,PX1 ×PX2
)
is the optimal probability of error of type II for testing the null hypothesis
PX1X2 with the alternative PX1 × PX2 , given that the probability of error of type I is smaller than ǫ;
this βǫ serves as a proxy for “distance” between PX1X2 and PX1 × PX2 . Similarly, in the general case
of an arbitrary number of parties with correlated side information at the eavesdropper, our main result
in Theorem 3 bounds the secret key length in terms of the “distance” between the joint distribution of
the observations of the parties and the eavesdropper and a distribution that renders the observations of
the parties conditionally independent across some partition, when conditioned on the eavesdropper’s side
information. This bound is a manifestation of the aforementioned heuristic principle and is termed the
conditional independence testing bound.
2Throughout this paper, IID observations refer to observations that are IID in time; at each instant t, the observations of the
parties are correlated.
3This basic result was reported separately in [73].
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3Our approach brings out a structural connection between SK agreement and binary hypothesis testing4.
This is in the spirit of [52], where a connection between channel coding and binary hypothesis testing
was used to establish an upper bound on the rate of good channel codes (see, also, [75], [28]). Also,
our upper bound is reminiscent of the measure of entanglement for a quantum state proposed in [74],
namely the minimum distance between the density matrix of the state and that of a disentangled state.
This measure of entanglement was shown to be an upper bound on the entanglement of distillation in
[74], where the latter is the largest proportion of maximally entangled states that can be distilled using
a purification process [6].
Using our basic result, we obtain new converses for SK agreement, and also, for secure two-party
computation by reducing SK agreement to oblivious transfer and bit commitment. In many cases, we
strengthen and improve upon previously known results. Our main contributions are summarized below.
A. Secret key agreement
For two parties, the problem of SK agreement from correlated observations is well-studied. The problem
was introduced by Maurer [44] and Ahlswede and Csisza´r [1], who considered the case where the parties
observe IID sequences. However, in certain applications it is of interest to consider observations arising
from a single realization of correlated RVs. For instance, in applications such as biometric and hardware
authentication (cf. [51], [20]), the correlated observations consist of different versions of the biometric
and hardware signatures, respectively, recorded at the registration and the authentication stages. To this
end, Renner and Wolf [60] derived bounds on the length of a SK that can be generated by two parties
observing a single realization of correlated RVs, using one-side communication.
The problem of SK agreement with multiple parties, for the IID setup, was introduced in [16] (also, see
[9] for an early formulation). In this work, we consider the SK agreement problem for multiple parties
observing a single realization of correlated RVs. Our conditional independence testing bound is a single-
shot upper bound on the length of SKs that can be generated by multiple parties observing correlated
data, using interactive public communication5. Unlike the single-shot upper bound in [60], which is
restricted to two parties with one-way communication, we allow arbitrary interactive communication
between multiple parties. Asymptotically our bound is tight – its application to the IID case recovers
4While the connection between SK agreement and hypothesis testing established in this paper is new, a similar connection
between authentication and hypothesis testing is natural to expect and is well-known (see, for instance, [45])
5A single-shot upper bound using Fano’s inequality for the length of a multiparty SK, obtained as a straightforward extension
of [16], [17], was reported in [72].
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4some previously known (tight) bounds on the asymptotic SK rates. In fact, we strengthen the previously
known asymptotic results since we do not require the probability of error in SK agreement or the secrecy
index to be asymptotically6 0. See Section IV for a detailed discussion.
B. Secure two-party computation
The problem of secure two-party computation was introduced by Yao in [83]. Two (mutually untrusting)
parties seek to compute a function of their collective data, without sharing anything more about their
data than what is given away by the function value. Several specific instances of this general problem
have been studied. We consider the problems of oblivious transfer (OT) and bit commitment (BC), which
constitute two basic primitives for secure two-party computation.
OT between two parties is a mode of message transmission “where the sender does not know whether
the recipient actually received the information” [55]. In this paper, we consider the one-of-two OT problem
[21] where the first party observes two strings K0 and K1 of length l each, and the second party seeks
the value of the Bth string, B ∈ {0, 1}. The goal is to accomplish this task in such a manner that
B and KB remain concealed, respectively, from Party 1 and Party 2. This simply stated problem is at
the heart of secure function computation as it is well-known [39] that any secure function computation
task can be accomplished using the basic OT protocol repeatedly (for recent results on the complexity
of secure function computation using OT, see [4]). Unfortunately, information theoretically secure OT
is not feasible in the absence of additional resources. On the bright side, if the parties share a noisy
communication channel or if they observe correlated randomness, OT can be accomplished (cf. [12],
[13], [2], [48]). In this paper, we consider the latter case where, as an additional resource, the parties
observe correlated RVs X1 and X2. Based on reduction arguments relating OT to SK agreement, we
derive upper bounds on the length l of OT that can be accomplished for given RVs X1,X2. The resulting
bound is, in general, tighter than that obtained in [79]. Furthermore, an application of our bound to the
case of IID observations shows that the upper bound on the rate of OT length derived in [48] and [2]7
is strong, i.e., the bound holds even without requiring asymptotically perfect recovery.
We now turn to the BC problem, the first instance of which was introduced by Blum in [7] as the
problem of flipping a coin over a telephone, when the parties do not trust each other. A bit commitment
protocol has two phases. In the first phase the committing party generates a random bit string K, its “coin
6Such bounds that do not require the probability of error to vanish to 0 are called strong converse bounds [15].
7The asymptotic bound in [2] is a special case of a more general asymptotic bound in [57], which is based on tension technique
introduced in [54]. It is not clear if our approach can derive a single-shot version of the general bound in [57].
September 13, 2018 DRAFT
5flip”. Subsequently, the two parties communicate with each other, which ends the first phase. In the second
phase, the committing party reveals K. A bit commitment protocol must forbid the committing party from
cheating and changing K in the second phase. As in the case of OT, information theoretically secure BC
is not possible without additional resources. We consider a version where two parties observing correlated
observations X1 and X2 want to implement information theoretically secure BC using interactive public
communication. The goal is to maximize the length of the committed string K. By reducing SK agreement
to BC, we derive an upper bound on BC length which improves upon the bound in [56]. Furthermore,
for the case of IID observations, we derive a strong converse for BC capacity; the latter is the maximum
rate of BC length and was characterized in [80].
C. Secure computation with trusted parties
In a different direction, we relate our result to the following problem of secure function computation
with trusted parties introduced in [69] (for an early version of the problem, see [50]): Multiple parties
observing correlated data seek to compute a function of their collective data. To this end, they com-
municate interactively over a public communication channel, which is assumed to be authenticated and
error-free. It is required that the value of the function be concealed from an eavesdropper with access to
the communication. When is such a secure computation of a given function feasible? In contrast to the
traditional secure computation problem discussed above, this setup is appropriate for applications such
as sensor networks where the legitimate parties are trusted and are free to extract any information about
each other’s data from the shared communication. Using the conditional independence testing bound, we
derive a necessary condition for the existence of a communication protocol that allows the parties to
reliably recover the value of a given function, while keeping this value concealed from an eavesdropper
with access to (only) the communication. In [69], matching necessary and sufficient conditions for secure
computability of a given function were derived for the case of IID observations. In contrast, our necessary
condition for secure computability is single-shot and does not rely on the observations being IID.
D. Outline of paper
The next section reviews some basic concepts that will be used throughout this work. The conditional
independence testing bound is derived in Section III. In the subsequent three sections, we present the
implications of this bound: Section IV addresses strong converses for SK capacity; Section V addresses
converse results for the OT and the bit commitment problem; and Section VI contains converse results
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6for the secure computation problem with trusted parties. The final section contains a brief discussion of
possible extensions.
E. Notations
For brevity, we use abbreviations SK, RV, and IID for secret key, random variable, and independent
and identically distributed, respectively; a plural form will be indicated by appending an ‘s’ to the
abbreviation. The RVs are denoted by capital letters and the corresponding range sets are denoted by
calligraphic letters. The distribution of a RV U is given by PU , when there is no confusion we drop the
subscript U . The set of all parties {1, ...,m} is denoted by M. For a collection of RVs {U1, .., Um} and
a subset A of M, UA denotes the RVs {Ui, i ∈ A}. For a RV U , Un denotes n IID repetitions of the
RV U . Similarly, Pn denotes the distribution corresponding to the n IID repetitions generated from P.
All logarithms in this paper are to the base 2.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Secret keys
Consider SK agreement using interactive public communication by m (trusted) parties. The ith party
observes a discrete RV Xi taking values in a finite set Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.8 Upon making these observations,
the parties communicate interactively over a public communication channel that is accessible by an
eavesdropper, who additionally observes a RV Z such that the RVs (XM, Z) have a distribution PXMZ .
We assume that the communication is error-free and each party receives the communication from every
other party. Furthermore, we assume that the public communication is authenticated and the eavesdropper
cannot tamper with it. Specifically, the communication is sent over r rounds of interaction. In the jth
round of communication, 1 ≤ j ≤ r, the ith party sends Fij , which is a function of its observation Xi,
a locally generated randomness9 Ui and the previously observed communication
F11, ..., Fm1, F12, ..., Fm2, ..., F1j , ..., F(i−1)j .
The overall interactive communication F11, ..., Fm1, ..., F1r , ..., Fmr is denoted by F. Using their local
observations and the interactive communication F, the parties agree on a SK.
8The conditional independence testing bound given in Theorem 3 remains valid even for continuous valued RVs. However,
in general, the resulting bound may not be achievable.
9The RVs U1, ..., Um are mutually independent and independent jointly of (XM, Z).
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7Formally, a SK is a collection of RVs K1, ...,Km, where the ith party gets Ki, that agree with
probability close to 1 and are concealed, in effect, from an eavesdropper. Formally, the ith party computes
a function Ki of (Ui,Xi,F). Traditionally, the RVs K1, ...,Km with a common range K constitute an
(ǫ, δ)-SK if the following two conditions are satisfied (for alternative definitions of secrecy, see [44],
[14], [16])
P (K1 = · · · = Km) ≥ 1− ǫ, (1)
d (PK1FZ ,Punif × PFZ) ≤ δ, (2)
where Punif is the uniform distribution on K and d (P,Q) is the variational distance between P and Q
given by
d (P,Q) =
1
2
∑
x
|P (x)−Q (x) |.
The first condition above represents the reliable recovery of the SK and the second condition guarantees
secrecy. In this work, we use the following alternative definition of a SK, which conveniently combines
the recoverability and the secrecy conditions (cf. [58]): The RVs K1, ...,Km above constitute an ǫ-SK
with common range K if
d
(
PKMFZ ,P
(M)
unif × PFZ
)
≤ ǫ, (3)
where
P
(M)
unif (kM) =
1(k1 = · · · = km)
|K|
.
In fact, the two definitions above are closely related10.
Proposition 1. Given 0 ≤ ǫ, δ < 1, if KM constitute an (ǫ, δ)-SK under (1) and (2), then they constitute
an (ǫ+ δ)-SK under (3).
Conversely, if KM constitute an ǫ-SK under (3), then they constitute an (ǫ, ǫ)-SK under (1) and (2).
Therefore, by the composition theorem in [8], the complex cryptographic protocols using such SKs
instead of perfect SKs are secure.11
We are interested in characterizing the maximum length log |K| of an ǫ-SK.
10Note that a SK agreement protocol that satisfies (3) universally composable-emulates an ideal SK agreement protocol (see
[8] for a definition).The emulation is with emulation slack ǫ, for an environment of unbounded computational complexity.
11A perfect SK refers to unbiased shared bits that are independent of eavesdropper’s observations.
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8Definition 1. Given 0 ≤ ǫ < 1, denote by Sǫ (XM|Z) the maximum length log |K| of an ǫ-SK KM with
common range K.
Our upper bound is based on relating the SK agreement problem to a binary hypothesis testing problem;
below we review some basic concepts in hypothesis testing that will be used.
B. Hypothesis testing
Consider a binary hypothesis testing problem with null hypothesis P and alternative hypothesis Q,
where P and Q are distributions on the same alphabet X . Upon observing a value x ∈ X , the observer
needs to decide if the value was generated by the distribution P or the distribution Q. To this end, the
observer applies a stochastic test T, which is a conditional distribution on {0, 1} given an observation
x ∈ X . When x ∈ X is observed, the test T chooses the null hypothesis with probability T(0|x) and
the alternative hypothesis with probability T(1|x) = 1−T(0|x). For 0 ≤ ǫ < 1, denote by βǫ(P,Q) the
infimum of the probability of error of type II given that the probability of error of type I is less than ǫ,
i.e.,
βǫ(P,Q) := inf
T :P[T]≥1−ǫ
Q[T], (4)
where
P[T] =
∑
x
P(x)T(0|x),
Q[T] =
∑
x
Q(x)T(0|x).
We note two important properties of the quantity βǫ(P,Q).
1) Data processing inequality. Let W be a stochastic mapping from X to Y , i.e., for each x ∈ X ,
W (·|x) is a distribution on Y . Then,
βǫ(P,Q) ≤ βǫ(P ◦W,Q ◦W ), (5)
where (P ◦W )(y) =
∑
x P (x)W (y|x).
2) Stein’s Lemma. (cf. [43, Theorem 3.3]) For every 0 < ǫ < 1, we have
lim
n→∞
−
1
n
log βǫ(P
n,Qn) = D(P‖Q), (6)
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9where D(P‖Q) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence given by
D(P‖Q) =
∑
x∈X
P(x) log
P(x)
Q(x)
,
with the convention 0 log(0/0) = 0.
C. Remarks on evaluation of βǫ(P,Q)
We close with a discussion on evaluating βǫ(P,Q). Note that the expression for βǫ(P,Q) in (4) is
a linear program, solving which has a polynomial complexity in the size of the observation space. A
simple manipulation yields the following computationally more tractable bound:
− log βǫ(P,Q) ≤ inf
γ
γ − log (Pγ − ǫ) , (7)
where
Pγ = P
({
x : log
P(x)
Q(x)
≤ γ
})
When P and Q correspond to IID RVs, the tail probability in (7) can be numerically evaluated directly
or can be approximated by the Be´rry-Esse´en theorem (cf. [22]). On the other hand, numerical evaluation
of the tail probability is rather involved when P and Q correspond to Markov chains. For this case, a
computationally tractable and asymptotically tight bound on βǫ(P,Q) was established recently in [77].
Also, by setting γ = Dα(P,Q)+ 11−α log(1− ǫ− ǫ
′), where Dα(P,Q) is the Re´nyi’s divergence of order
α > 1 and given by [61]
Dα(P,Q) =
1
α− 1
log
∑
x∈X
P(x)αQ(x)1−α,
the following simple bound on βǫ(P,Q) is obtained12:
− log βǫ(P,Q) ≤ Dα(P,Q) +
1
α− 1
log
1
1− ǫ− ǫ′
+ log
1
ǫ′
. (8)
A variant of this bound for the case of quantum observations was reported in [49, Theorem 1] (see, also,
[27, Eqn. (2.63)]). For the classical case, the bound follows from the simple proof below: Denote by Aγ
12For other connections between βǫ and Re´nyi’s divergence, see [27, Eqns. (3.37) and (3.38)], [53, Eqn. (29)].
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the set {x : log P(x)/Q(x) ≤ γ}. Thus, for α > 1,
1− Pγ =
∑
x∈Acγ
P(x)
=
∑
x∈Acγ
P(x)αP(x)1−α
<
∑
x∈Acγ
P(x)αQ(x)1−α2(1−α)γ
≤ 2(α−1)Dα(P,Q)+(1−α)γ
= (1− ǫ− ǫ′),
which further implies that Pγ > ǫ+ ǫ′. The bound (8) follows from (7). Note that while the bound (8)
is not tight in general, as its corollary we obtain Stein’s lemma (see (6)).
Finally, we remark that when the condition
log
P(X)
Q(X)
= D(P‖Q) (9)
is satisfied with probability 1 under P, the bound in (7) implies
− log βǫ(P,Q) ≤ D(P‖Q) + log(1/(1 − ǫ)). (10)
D. Smooth min-entropy and smooth max-divergence
Given two RVs X and Y , a central question of information theoretic secrecy is (cf. [34], [35], [5]):
How many unbiased, independent bits can be extracted from X that are unavailable to an observer of Y ?
When the underlying distribution is IID, the optimum rate of extracted bits can be expressed in terms
of Shannon entropies and is given by H(X|Y ). However, for our single-shot setup, smooth min-entropy
introduced in [60], [58] is a more relevant measure of randomness. We use the definition of smooth min
entropy introduced13 in [58]; for a review of other variations, see [63].
We also review the leftover hash lemma [34], [5], which brings out the central role of smooth min-
entropy in the answer to the question above. Also, as a “change of measure companion” for smooth
min-entropy, we define smooth max-divergence and note that it satisfies the data processing inequality.
13A review of the notion of smooth minimum entropy without the notations from quantum information theory can be also
found in [76].
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Definition 2. (min-entropy) The min-entropy of P is defined as
Hmin(P) := min
x
log
1
P (x)
.
For distributions PXY and QY , the conditional min-entropy of PXY given QY is defined as
Hmin(PXY |QY ) := min
x∈X , y ∈ supp(QY )
log
QY (y)
PXY (x, y)
.
Finally, the conditional minimum entropy14 of PXY given Y is defined as
Hmin(PXY |Y ) := sup
QY
Hmin(PXY |QY ), (11)
where the sup is over all QY such that supp(PY ) ⊆ supp(QY ).
Note that
Hmin(PXY |Y ) = − inf
QY
max
x,y
log
PXY (x, y)
QY (y)
= − inf
QY
max
y
log
PY (y)maxx PX|Y (x|y)
QY (y)
= − log
∑
y
PY (y)max
x
PX|Y (x|y)− inf
QY
max
y
log
P˜Y (y)
QY (y)
= − log
∑
y
PY (y)max
x
PX|Y (x|y)− inf
QY
Dmax(P˜Y ‖QY )
= − log
∑
y
PY (y)max
x
PX|Y (x|y) ,
where P˜Y (y) =
(∑
y′ PY (y
′)maxx PX|Y (x|y
′)
)−1
PY (y)maxx PX|Y (x) and the final equality holds
since the max-divergence Dmax(P‖Q) (see Definition 4 below) is nonnegative and equals 0 if and only
if P = Q. This alternative form of conditional min-entropy was first derived in [41] for a more general,
quantum setup (see, also, [36, Theorem 2(ii)]) and shows that Hmin(PXY |Y ) corresponds to the − log
of the average conditional guessing probability for X given Y . However, the original form in (11) is
more suited for our purpose.
The definition of min-entropy and conditional min-entropy remain valid for all subnormalized, non-
14There are other definitions of conditional min-entropy available in the literature. The form here is perhaps the most widely
used and is appropriate for our purpose.
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negative functions PXY , i.e., PXY such that
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y) ≤ 1.
We need this extension and the concept of smoothing, defined next, to derive tight bounds.
Definition 3. (Smooth min-entropy) Given ǫ ≥ 0, the ǫ-smooth conditional minimum entropy of PXY
given Y is defined as
Hǫmin(PXY |Y ) := sup
P˜XY : d(PXY ,P˜XY )≤ ǫ
Hmin(P˜XY |Y ),
where the sup is over all subnormalized, nonnegative functions P˜XY . When Y is a constant, the ǫ-smooth
min-entropy is denoted by Hǫmin(PX).
We now state the leftover hash lemma, which says that we can extract Hǫmin (PXY |Y ) unbiased,
independent bits from X that are effectively concealed from an observer of Y .
Lemma 2. (Leftover hash) [58] Given a joint distribution PXY , for every 0 ≤ 2ǫ < 1 and 0 < η there
exists a mapping15 K : X → K with log |K| = ⌊Hǫmin (PXY |Y )− 2 log(1/2η)⌋ such that
d
(
PK(X)Y ,Punif × PY
)
≤ 2ǫ+ η.
Finally, we review smooth max-divergence, which was introduced first in [18] for a quantum setting.
The method of smoothing in the following definition is slightly different from the one in [18] and is
tailored to our purpose.
Definition 4. (Smooth max-divergence) The max-divergence between two distributions P and Q is
defined as
Dmax(P‖Q) := max
x
log
P (x)
Q (x)
,
with the convention log(0/0) = 0, and for 0 < ǫ < 1, the ǫ-smooth max-divergence between P and Q
is defined as
Dǫmax(P‖Q) := inf
P˜≤P:
P˜(X )≥ 1−ǫ
Dmax(P˜‖Q),
15A randomly chosen function from a 2-universal hash family suffices.
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where the inf is over all subnormalized, nonnegative functions P˜ such that P˜ (x) ≤ P (x) for all x ∈ X
and
∑
x P˜ (x) ≥ 1− ǫ.
The following two properties of smooth max-divergence will be used:
1) Data processing inequality. For every stochastic mapping W : X → Y ,
Dǫmax(P ◦W‖Q ◦W ) ≤ D
ǫ
max(P‖Q). (12)
Indeed, for every P˜ such that P˜ (x) ≤ P (x) for all x ∈ X and
∑
x P˜ (x) ≥ 1 − ǫ, the following
hold
(P˜ ◦W )(Y) ≥ 1− ǫ,
(P˜ ◦W )(y) ≤ (P ◦W )(y), ∀ y ∈ Y.
The property follows upon noting that for every y ∈ Y
Dmax(P˜‖Q) = max
x
log
P˜ (x)
Q (x)
≥ log
(P˜ ◦W )(y)
(Q ◦W )(y)
,
since maxi(ai/bi) ≥ (
∑
i ai/
∑
i bi).
2) Convergence to Kullback-Leibler divergence. For IID distributions Pn and Qn,
lim
n→∞
1
n
Dǫmax(P
n‖Qn) = D(P‖Q), ∀ 0 < ǫ < 1.
The inequality ‘≤’ holds trivially if D(P‖Q) =∞. Thus, it suffices to prove it under the assumption
that D(P‖Q) is finite. To that end, consider P˜n(x) = Pn(x)1(x ∈ Tn), where Tn is the (strongly)
typical set for Pn (cf. [15]). For a sequence x ∈ X n and an element x ∈ X , denote by N(x|x)
the number of occurrences of x in x. Then, every sequence x ∈ Tn satisfies (cf. [15])∣∣∣∣N(x|x)n − P (x)
∣∣∣∣ < δn, x ∈ X , (13)
where δn → 0 as n→ 0 (for precise conditions, see the δ-convention in [15]). Note that P˜n ≤ Pn
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and P˜n(X n) = Pn(Tn) ≥ 1− ǫ for all n sufficiently large. Thus,
1
n
Dǫmax(P
n‖Qn) ≤
1
n
Dmax(P˜n‖Q
n)
= max
x∈Tn
1
n
log
Pn(x)
Qn(x)
= max
x∈Tn
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
P(xi)
Q(xi)
= max
x∈Tn
∑
x∈X
N(x|x)
n
log
P (x)
Q (x)
≤
∑
x∈X
P (x) log
P (x)
Q (x)
+ o(1),
where the last inequality follows from (13) under the assumption that D(P‖Q) <∞.
For the inequality in the other direction, suppose we are given a P˜n ≤ Pn with P˜n(X n) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Then,
P˜n(Tn) = P˜n(X
n)− P˜n(T
c
n )
≥ 1− ǫ− P˜n(T
c
n )
≥ 1− ǫ− Pn(T cn )
≥ (1− ǫ)/2, (14)
for all n sufficiently large. This further implies that there exists an x0 ∈ Tn such that
P˜n(x0) ≥ P
n(x0)(1 − ǫ)/2.
Indeed, if not, then P˜n(x) < Pn(x)(1 − ǫ)/2 for all x ∈ Tn, which further implies P˜n(Tn) <
(1− ǫ)/2 contradicting (14). Thus,
1
n
max
x
log
P˜n(x)
Qn(x)
≥
1
n
log
P˜n(x0)
Qn(x0)
≥
1
n
log
Pn(x0)
Qn(x0)
+
1
n
log
1− ǫ
2
.
For the case D(P‖Q) = ∞, there exists x+ ∈ X such that P(x+) > 0 and Q(x+) = 0. Since
x0 ∈ Tn, N(x+|x0) > 0 and the right-side of the inequality above, too, is infinity. On the other
hand, if D(P‖Q) is finite, using (13) for the sequence x0 ∈ Tn, the right-side of the inequality
above is further bounded below by D(P‖Q)− o(1), which completes the proof.
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III. THE CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE TESTING BOUND
Converse results of this paper are based on an upper bound on the maximum length Sǫ (XM|Z) of an
ǫ-SK. We present this basic result here16.
Consider a (nontrivial) partition π = {π1, ..., πl} of the set M. Heuristically, if the underlying
distribution of the observations PXMZ is such that XM are conditionally independent across the partition
π given Z , the length of a SK that can be generated is 0. Our approach is to bound the length of a
generated SK in terms of “how far” is the distribution PXMZ from another distribution QπXMZ that renders
XM conditionally independent across the partition π given Z – the closeness of the two distributions is
measured by βǫ
(
PXMZ ,Q
π
XMZ
)
.
Specifically, for a partition π with |π| ≥ 2 parts, let Q(π) be the set of all distributions QπXMZ that
factorize as follows:
QπXM|Z(x1, . . . , xm|z) =
|π|∏
i=1
QπXpii |Z
(xπi |z). (15)
Theorem 3 (Conditional independence testing bound). Given 0 ≤ ǫ < 1, 0 < η < 1 − ǫ, and a
partition π of M. It holds that
Sǫ (XM|Z) ≤
1
|π| − 1
[
− log βǫ+η
(
PXMZ ,Q
π
XMZ
)
+ |π| log(1/η)
]
(16)
for all QπXMZ ∈ Q(π).
Remark 1. Renner and Wolf [60] derived a bound on the length of a SK that can be generated by two
parties using one-way communication. A comparison of this bound with the general bound in Theorem
3 is unavailable, since the former involves auxiliary RVs and is difficult to evaluate.
Remark 2. For m = 2 and Z = constant, the upper bound on the length of a SK in Theorem 3 is related
closely to the meta-converse of Polyanskiy, Poor, and Verdu´ [52]. Indeed, a code for reliable transmission
of a message M over a point-to-point channel yields a SK for the sender and the receiver; the length
of this SK can be bounded by Theorem 3. However, the resulting bound is slightly weaker than the
meta-converse and does not yield the correct third order asymptotic term (the coefficient of log n) in the
optimal size of transmission codes [64].
Remark 3. The proof of Theorem 3 below remains valid even when the secrecy condition (3) is replaced
16The results of this section were presented in [73].
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by the following more general condition:
d
(
PKMFZ ,P
(M)
unif ×QFZ
)
≤ ǫ,
for some distribution QFZ . In particular, upper bound (16) holds even under the relaxed secrecy criterion
above.
The key idea underlying our proof of Theorem 3 is a lower bound for − log βǫ(P,Q) for a binary
hypothesis testing problem with observation space Km, null hypothesis P given by
PK1K2...Km = P
(M)
unif (17)
and the alternative hypothesis Q given by
QK1K2...Km =
m∏
i=1
QKi (18)
namely the problem of testing if K1....Km constitute a perfectly correlated uniform randomness or are
they mutually independent.
Lemma 4. For PKM = PK1...Km and QKM = QK1...Km given in (17) and (18), it holds for every
0 < η < 1 that
log |K| ≤
1
m− 1
[
− log βη
(
PKM ,QKM
)
+m log(1/η)
]
.
Proof: Consider the log-likelihood ratio test with threshold λ given by
λ = (m− 1) log |K| −m log(1/η),
i.e., the deterministic test with the following acceptance region (for the null hypothesis)
A :=
{
kM : log
PKM (kM)
QKM (kM)
≥ λ
}
.
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For this test, the probability of error of type II is bounded above as
QKM(A) =
∑
kM∈A
QKM (kM)
≤ 2−λ
∑
kM∈A
PKM (kM)
≤ 2−λ
= |K|1−mη−m. (19)
On the other hand, the probability of error of type I is given by
PKM (A
c) =
1
|K|
|{k : k = (k, ..., k) ∈ Ac}|
=
1
|K|
∑
k
1 (k ∈ Ac)
=
1
|K|
∑
k
1 (QKM (k) |K|
mηm > 1) , (20)
where k := (k, . . . , k) and the second equality holds since Ac consists of elements kM satisfying
PKM (kM)
QKM (kM)
=
1(k1 = · · · = km)
|K|QKM (M)
< 2λ = |K|m−1ηm.
The inner sum can be further upper bounded as
∑
k
1 (QKM (k) |K|
mηm > 1) ≤
∑
k
(QKM (k) |K|
mηm)
1
m
= |K|η
∑
k
QKM (k)
1
m
= |K|η
∑
k
m∏
i=1
QKi (k)
1
m
≤ |K|η
m∏
i=1
(∑
k
QKi (k)
) 1
m
,
= |K|η. (21)
where the second inequality above holds by Ho¨lder’s inequality. Upon combining (20) and (21) we obtain
PKM (A
c) ≤ η.
Thus, we have a test with probability of error of type I less than η and the probability of error of type
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II bounded as in (19). Therefore,
βη
(
PKM ,QKM
)
≤ |K|1−mη−m,
which completes the proof.
The distribution PKM in (17) corresponds to a perfect secret key shared by m parties. The next result
extends Lemma 4 to the case where not only the key values KM but also the communication F and the
eavesdropper’s side information Z are observed, and the null hypothesis PKMFZ corresponds to an ǫ-SK
KM.
Lemma 5. For an ǫ-SK KM with a common range K generated using an interactive communication F,
let WKMF|XMZ be the resulting conditional distribution17 on (KM,F) given (XM, Z). Then, for every
0 < η < 1− ǫ and every QXMZ =
∏m
i=1 QXi|ZQZ , we have
log |K| ≤
1
m− 1
[
− log βǫ+η
(
PKMFZ ,QKMFZ
)
+m log(1/η)
]
, (22)
where PKMFZ is the marginal of (KM,F, Z) for the joint distribution
PKMFXMZ = PXMZWKMF|XMZ ,
and QπKMFZ is the corresponding marginal for the joint distribution
QKMFXMZ = QXMZWKMF|XMZ .
Also, we need the following basic property of interactive communication from [68], which will be
used throughout this paper (see, also, [1, Lemma 2.2], [15, Lemma 17.18]).
Lemma 6 (Interactive communication property). Given QXMZ =
∏m
i=1 QXi|ZQZ and an interactive
communication F, the following holds:
QXM|FZ (xM|f, z) =
m∏
i=1
QXi|FZ (xi|f, z) ,
i.e., conditionally independent observations remain so when conditioned additionally on an interactive
communication. In particular, if QX1X2|Z = QX1|ZQX2|Z , then
QX1X2|FZ = QX1|FZ ×QX2|FZ .
17The conditional distribution WKMF|XMZ is defined only for (xM, z) with PXMZ (xM, z) > 0.
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Proof of Lemma 5. The proof is a simple modification of the proof of Lemma 4. First note that by
Lemma 6 and the fact Ki is a function of (Xi, Ui) given F, we have
QKM|FZ =
m∏
i=1
QKi|FZ .
Thus, Lemma 4 applies with distribution QKM|FZ in the role of Q for every F = f, Z = z, and
consequently, for every (f, z) there exists a set Af,z such that
QKM|FZ (Af,z|f, z) ≤ |K|
1−mη−m, (23)
and
P
(M)
unif(A
c
f,z) ≤ η. (24)
We consider the following test for a binary hypothesis testing problem with null hypothesis P(M)unif×PFZ
and alternative hypothesis QKMFZ : For an observed (kM, f, z), we accept the null hypothesis if kM ∈
Af,z and alternative otherwise. Using (23), the probability of error of type II is bounded above by
∑
f,z
QFZ (f, z)QKM|FZ (Af,z|f, z) ≤ |K|
1−mη−m,
and by (24), the probability of error of type I is bounded above by
∑
f,z
PFZ (f, z) P
(M)
unif(Af,z) ≤ η.
Finally, we consider the hypothesis testing problem with null hypothesis PKMFZ and alternative hy-
pothesis QKMFZ and apply the same test as above. Clearly, the probability of error of type II remains
unchanged. Furthermore, in view of the secrecy condition (3), the probability of error of type I will
increase by at most ǫ, which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. We first consider the partition π with one element in each part, i.e., πi = {i}
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. For this case, it follows from Lemma 5 and the data processing inequality (5) with
P = PXMZ , Q = Q
π
XMZ
, and W = WKMF|XMZ , that for an ǫ-SK KM taking values in the set K
log |K| ≤
1
m− 1
[
− log βǫ+η
(
PKMFZ ,Q
π
KMFZ
)
+m log(1/η)
]
.
≤
1
m− 1
[
− log βǫ+η
(
PXMZ ,Q
π
XMZ
)
+m log(1/η)
]
(25)
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for every 1 < η < 1− ǫ.
To extend (25) to an arbitrary partition π, we claim that an ǫ-SK for the original model with m
parties yields an ǫ-SK of the same length for a model with |π| parties with the ith party observing Xπi ,
1 ≤ i ≤ |π|, and the eavesdropper observing the RV Z as before. The result follows by applying the
bound (25) to the new model with |π| parties.
It only remains to prove the claim above. To that end, given an ǫ-SK KM for the original model,
we define an ǫ-SK for the new model (with the ith party observing Xπi) as follows: The parties run
the protocol for generating KM with communication corresponding to any party j ∈ πi in the original
model transmitted by the ith party in the new model. For each party i in the new model, we select a
representative party i0 ∈ πi; for concreteness, let i0 be the smallest index in the set πi. An ǫ-SK for the
new model is given by (K ′1, ...,K ′|π|) where K
′
i = Ki0 since, denoting by P
(π)
unif the distribution
P
(π)
unif(k1, ..., k|π|) =
1
|K|
1(k1 = · · · = k|π|),
we have by the traingle inequality that
d
(
PK ′
1
...K ′|pi|FZ
,P
(π)
unif × PFZ
)
≤ d
(
PK1...KmFZ ,P
(M)
unif × PFZ
)
≤ ǫ,
which completes the proof.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR SECRET KEY CAPACITY
For the SK agreement problem, a special case of interest is when the observations consist of n length
IID sequences, i.e., the ith party observes (Xi1, ...,Xin) and the eavesdropper observes (Z1, ..., Zn) such
that the RVs {XMt, Zt}nt=1 are IID. For this case, it is well known that a SK of length proportional to
n can be generated; the maximum rate (log |Kn|/n) of a SK is called the SK capacity [44], [1], [16].
To present the results of this section at full strength, we need to take recourse to the original definition
of (ǫ, δ)-SK given in (1) and (2). In the manner of Definition 1, denote by Sǫ,δ(XM|Z) the maximum
length of an (ǫ, δ)-SK. It follows from Proposition 1 that Sǫ,δ(XM|Z) ≤ Sǫ+δ(XM|Z).
Definition 5. (SK capacity) Given 0 < ǫ, δ < 1, the (ǫ, δ)-SK capacity Cǫ,δ (XM|Z) is defined by
Cǫ,δ (XM|Z) := lim inf
n→∞
1
n
Sǫ,δ(X
n
M|Z
n),
where the RVs {XMt, Zt} are IID for 1 ≤ t ≤ n, with a common distribution PXMZ . The SK capacity
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C (XM|Z) is defined as the limit
C (XM|Z) := lim
ǫ,δ→0
Cǫ,δ (XM|Z) .
For the case when the eavesdropper does not observe any side information, i.e., Z = constant, the SK
capacity for two parties was characterized by Maurer [44] and Ahlswede and Csisza´r [1]. Later, the SK
capacity for a multiparty model, with Z =constant was characterized by Csisza´r and Narayan [16]. The
general problem of characterizing the SK capacity for arbitrary Z remains open. Several upper bounds
for SK capacity are known [44], [1], [46], [59], [16], [17], [26], which are tight for special cases.
In this section, we derive a single-shot version of the Gohari-Anantharam bound [26] on the SK
capacity for two parties, which is the best known bound for this case. Furthermore, for multiple parties,
we establish a strong converse for SK capacity, which shows that, surprisingly, we cannot improve the
rate of a SK by relaxing the recoverability requirement (1) or the secrecy requirement (2).
A. Converse results for two parties
It was shown in [26] that for two parties,
C(X1,X2|Z) ≤ min
U
I (X1 ∧X2|U) + I(X1,X2 ∧ U |Z). (26)
The proof in [26] relied critically on the assumption that the RVs {(XMt, Zt)}nt=1 are IID and does not
apply to the single-shot setup. The result below is a single-shot version of (26) and is proved by relying
only on the structure of the SKs, without recourse to the potential function approach18 of [26].
Theorem 7. For 0 < ǫ, δ with ǫ+ 2δ < 1,
Sǫ,δ(X1,X2|Z) ≤ Sǫ,2δ+η(X1,X2|Z,U) +D
ξ
max
(
PX1X2ZU‖PX1X2ZPU |Z
)
+ 2 log(1/2(η − ξ)) + 1,
for every RV U and every 0 ≤ ξ < η < 1− ǫ− 2δ.
As corollaries, we obtain a single-shot version and a strong version of the upper bound in (26), which
does not require perfect asymptotic recovery or perfect asymptotic secrecy.
18In fact, a simple proof of (26) follows upon noting that for an optimum rate SK (K1,K2) recoverable from a communication
F, the SK capacity C(X1, X2|Z) approximately equals (1/n)H(K1|F, Zn) ≤ (1/n)H(K1|F, Un, Zn) + (1/n)I(K1,F ∧
Un|Zn), which is further bounded above by C(X1, X2|U) + I(X1, X2 ∧ U |Z).
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Corollary 8 (Single-shot bound for SK length). For 0 < ǫ, δ with ǫ+ 2δ < 1,
Sǫ,δ(X1,X2|Z) ≤ − log βǫ+2δ+η(PX1X2ZU ,PX1|ZUPX2ZU )
+Dη1max
(
PX1X2ZU‖PX1X2ZPU |Z
)
+ 4 log(1/(η − η1 − η2)) + 1,
for every RV U and every 0 ≤ η1 + η2 < η < 1− ǫ− 2δ.
Corollary 9 (Strong bound for SK capacity). For 0 ≤ ǫ, δ with ǫ+ 2δ < 1,
Cǫ,δ(X1,X2|Z) ≤ min
U
I (X1 ∧X2|U) + I(X1,X2 ∧ U |Z).
We conclude this section with proofs. The core of Theorem 7 is contained in the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Let (K1,K2) be an (ǫ, δ)-SK taking values in K, recoverable from a communication F.
Then,
H
δ+ξ/2
min (PK1FZU |FZU) ≥ log |K| −D
ξ
max
(
PK1FZU‖PK1FZPU |Z
)
for every RV U and every 0 ≤ ξ < 1− ǫ− 2δ.
Proof of Theorem 7. Let (K1,K2) be an (ǫ, δ)-SK taking values in K. Then, by Lemma 10 and the
data processing property of smooth max-divergence (12), we get
H
δ+ξ/2
min (PK1FZU |FZU) ≥ log |K| −D
ξ
max
(
PX1X2ZU‖PX1X2ZPU |Z
)
.
By the leftover hash lemma (see Section II-D), there exists a mapping K ′ of K taking at least log |K| −
Dξmax
(
PX1X2ZU‖PX1X2ZPU |Z
)
− 2 log(1/2(η − ξ))− 1 values and satisfying
d
(
PK ′(K1)FZU ,Punif × PFZU
)
≤ 2δ + η.
Therefore, (K ′(K1),K ′(K2)) constitutes an (ǫ, 2δ + η)-SK for X1 and X2, when the eavesdropper
observes (Z,U) and so,
log |K| −Dξmax
(
PX1X2ZU‖PX1X2ZPU |Z
)
− 2 log(1/2(η − ξ))− 1 ≤ Sǫ,2δ+η(X1,X2|Z,U).
Corollary 8 follows by Theorem 3.
Proof of Corollary 9. The result follows by Corollary 8 upon using Stein’s lemma (see Section II-B),
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along with the convergence property of smooth max-divergence (see Section II-D).
Proof of Lemma 10. By definitions of Hδ+ξ/2min and Dξmax, it suffices to show that for every mapping
T : (k1, f, z, u) 7→ [0, 1] such that
∑
k1,f,z,u
P (k1, f, z, u)T (k1, f, z, u) ≥ 1− ξ, (27)
here exist a subnormalized nonnegative function QK1FZU and a distribution Q˜FZU satisfying the follow-
ing:
d (PK1FZU ,QK1FZU) ≤ δ + ξ/2, (28)
Hmin
(
QK1FZU |Q˜FZU
)
= log |K| −Dmax
(
PK1FZUT‖PK1FZPU |Z
)
. (29)
To that end, consider QK1FZU given by
Q (k1, f, z, u) := Punif (k1) P (f, z) P (u|k1, f, z)T (k1, f, z, u), (30)
which is a valid subnormalized nonnegative function since T (k1, f, z, u) ≤ 1. Furthermore, since
P (k1, f, z, u) = P (k1, f, z) P (u|k1, f, z) ,
we get (28) as follows:
d (PK1FZU ,QK1FZU ) ≤ d (PK1FZ ,PunifPFZ) +
∑
k1,f,z,u
P (k1, f, z, u) (1− T (k1, f, z, u))
≤ δ +
ξ
2
,
where the first inequality is by the triangle inequality and the fact that T (k1, f, z, u) ≤ 1, and the last
inequality uses the secrecy condition (2) and the assumption (27).
Next, for Q˜FZU defined by
Q˜(f, z, u) := P (f, z) P (u|z) (31)
and QK1FZU defined in (30), observe that
Q (k1, f, z, u)
Q˜(f, z, u)
= Punif (k)
[
P (u|k1, f, z)
P (u|z)
]
T (k1, f, z, u)
= Punif (k)
[
P (k1, f, z, u)
P (k1, f, z) P (u|z)
]
T (k1, f, z, u)
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and so,
Hmin
(
QK1FZU |Q˜FZU
)
= log |K| − max
k1,f,z,u
log
P (k1, f, z, u)T (k1, f, z, u)
P (k1, f, z) P (u|z)
,
which is the same as (29).
B. Strong converse for multiple parties
Now we move to the m terminal case where the eavesdropper gets no side information, i.e., Z =
constant. With this simplification, the SK capacity C (XM) for multiple parties was characterized by
Csisza´r and Narayan [16]. Furthermore, they introduced the remarkable expression on the right-side of
(32) below as an upper bound for C (XM), and showed its tightness for m = 2, 3. Later, the tightness
of the upper bound for arbitrary m was shown in [10]; we summarize these developments in the result
below.
Theorem 11. [16], [10] The SK capacity for the case when eavesdropper’s side information Z = constant
is given by
C (XM) = min
π
1
|π| − 1
D
(
PXM
∥∥∥∥
|π|∏
i=1
PXpii
)
, (32)
where the min is over all partitions π of M.
This generalized the classic result of Maurer [44] and Ahlswede and Csisza´r [1], which established
that for two parties, C (X1,X2) = D (PX1X2‖PX1 × PX2) = I (X1 ∧X2).
The converse part of Theorem 11 relied critically on the fact that ǫn + δn → 0 as n → ∞. Below
we strengthen the converse and show that the upper bound for SK rates implied by Theorem 11 holds
even when (ǫn, δn) is fixed. Specifically, for 0 < ǫ, δ with ǫ+ δ < 1 and Z = constant, an application of
Theorem 3 to the IID RVs XnM, with QπXnM =
∏|π|
i=1 P
n
Xpii
, yields
Sǫ,δ (X
n
1 , ...,X
n
m) ≤
1
|π| − 1

− log βǫ+δ+η

PnXM ,
|π|∏
i=1
PnXpii

+ |π| log(1/η)

 ,
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where η < 1− ǫ− δ. Therefore, using Stein’s Lemma (see (6)) we get
Cǫ,δ (XM) ≤
1
|π| − 1
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
log βǫ+δ+η

PnXM ,
|π|∏
i=1
PnXpii


=
1
|π| − 1
D
(
PXM
∥∥∥∥
|π|∏
i=1
PXpii
)
.
Also, note that if ǫ + δ ≥ 1, the SK rate can be infinity. Indeed, consider a (0, 1)-SK where party 1
generates a RV K1 uniformly over a set K and sends it to the other parties over the public communication
channel, and a (1, 0)-SK where the ith party generates Ki uniformly over K using its local randomness
Ui (without any public communication). If ǫ + δ ≥ 1, the SK which equals the (0, 1)-SK above with
probability (1 − ǫ) and the (1, 0)-SK above with probability ǫ constitutes an (ǫ, 1 − ǫ)-SK of length
log |K|, and therefore, also an (ǫ, δ)-SK of the same length. Since K was arbitrary, the length of the
resulting (ǫ, δ)-SK can be arbitrarily large.
Thus, we have established the following strong converse for the SK capacity when Z = constant.
Corollary 12 (Strong converse for SK capacity). Given 0 < ǫ, δ < 1, the (ǫ, δ)-SK capacity Cǫ,δ (XM)
is given by
Cǫ,δ (XM) = min
π
1
|π| − 1
D
(
PXM
∥∥∥∥
|π|∏
i=1
PXpii
)
, if ǫ+ δ < 1,
and
Cǫ,δ (XM) =∞, if ǫ+ δ ≥ 1.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURE TWO-PARTY COMPUTATION
In this section, we consider secure computation by two (mutually untrusting) parties. First introduced
by Yao in [83], these problems have propelled the research in cryptography over the last three decades.
In particular, we will consider the oblivious transfer and the bit commitment problem, the two basic
primitives for secure two-party computation. We will look at the information theoretic versions of these
problems where, as an additional resource, the parties observe correlated RVs X1 and X2. Our converse
results are based on reduction arguments which relate these problems to the SK agreement problem,
enabling the application of Theorem 3 (see Fig. 1).
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Oblivious Transfer Bit Commitment
Secure Two-Party Computation
Fig. 1. Depiction of our reduction arguments.
A. Maximum common function and minimum sufficient statistic
To state our results, we need the notions of maximum common function and minimum sufficient statistic.
The notion of maximum common function was introduced in [24] as a measure of “common information”
of random variables X1 and X2. Its role in secrecy was first highlighted in [82] (see, also, [69], [47] for
different roles of the maximum common function in secrecy and privacy.) Operationally, the maximum
common function of X1 and X2 is defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Maximum Common Function). A common function of X1 and X2 is a random variable
U for which there there exist functions φ1(X1) and φ2(X2) such that P (U = φ1(X1) = φ2(X2)) = 1.
The maximum common function19 of X1 and X2, denoted by mcf(X1,X2), is a common function of
X1 and of X2 such that every common function U of X1 and X2 is a function of mcf(X1,X2), i.e.,
H(U |mcf(X1,X2)) = 0.
In fact, [24] characterized mcf(X1,X2) and showed that it corresponds to the following equivalence
relation on X1 (or a similarly defined equivalence relation on X2)
x1 ∼ x
′
1 ⇔∃x21, ..., x2k ∈ X2 and x12, ..., x1k ∈ X1 s.t. with x11 = x1 and x1(k+1) = x′1,
PX1X2 (x1i, x2i) PX1X2
(
x1(i+1), x2i
)
> 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The role of minimum sufficient statistic in secrecy was highlighted in [82] as well. We give its
operational definition below.
19By definition, it is unique up to relabeling.
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Definition 7 (Minimum Sufficient Satistics). A sufficient statistic for X2 given X1 is a random
variable U such that there exists a function U = g(X1) such that the Markov chain X1—U—X2
holds. The minimum sufficient statistics for X2 given X1, denoted by mss(X2|X1), is a sufficient
statistics for X2 given X1 such that it is a function of every sufficient statistic U for X2 given X1,
i.e., H(mss(X2|X1)|U) = 0.
An exact characterization of mss(X2|X1) is available, too, and it corresponds to the following equiv-
alence relation on X1 (cf. [23], [37], [67]):
x1 ∼ x
′
1 ⇔ PX2|X1 (x2|x1) = PX2|X1
(
x2|x
′
1
)
, for all x2 ∈ X2.
B. Oblivious transfer
We present bounds on the efficiency of implementing information theoretically secure one-of-two OT
using correlated randomness. Suppose that party 1 generates K0 and K1, distributed uniformly over
{0, 1}l , and party 2 generates B, distributed uniformly over {0, 1}, as inputs to an OT protocol. The RVs
K0,K1, and B are assumed to be mutually independent20. The goal of an OT protocol is for Party 2
to obtain KB in such a manner that B is concealed from Party 1 and KB is concealed from party 2,
where B = 1⊕B. Furthermore, Party i observes the RV Xi, i = 1, 2, as a resource to implement an OT
protocol, where RVs (X1,X2) are independent jointly of (K0,K1, B). During the protocol, the parties
are allowed to communicate interactively. In general, the parties are allowed to use local randomization;
for simplicity of presentation, we restrict ourselves to protocols without local randomization. However,
as pointed-out in Remark 6 below, our results remain valid even when local randomization is allowed.
Definition 8. (Oblivious transfer) A protocol realizing an (ǫ, δ1, δ2)-OT (for a passive adversary21) of
length l consists of an interactive communication F and an estimate Kˆ = Kˆ(X2, B,F) by Party 2 such
20Strictly speaking, OT refers to the problem where the strings K0,K1 and the bit B are fixed. The randomized version here
is sometimes referred as oblivious key transfer (see [3], [81]) or fully randomized oblivious transfer (see [78], [42]), and they
are equivalent to OT.
21Here, “passive adversary” refers to an “honest but curious” adversary that follows the protocol, but is curious to know the
other party’s input. Since we consider only converse results for OT, this assumption only strengthens our results and they remain
valid for more powerful, active adversaries.
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that the following conditions are satisfied:
P
(
KB 6= Kˆ
)
≤ ǫ, (33)
d
(
PKBX2BF,PKB × PX2BF
)
≤ δ1, (34)
d (PBK0K1X1F,PB × PK0K1X1F) ≤ δ2, (35)
where B = 1⊕B. The first condition above denotes the reliability of OT, while the second and the third
conditions ensure secrecy for party 1 and 2, respectively. Denote by Lǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) the largest l such
that a protocol realizing an (ǫ, δ1, δ2)-OT of length l exists.
When the underlying observations X1,X2 consist of n-length IID sequences Xn1 ,Xn2 with common
distribution PX1X2 , it is known that Lǫ,δ1,δ2(Xn1 ,Xn2 ) may grow linearly with n (cf. [48], [2]); the largest
rate of growth is called the OT capacity.
Definition 9 (OT capacity). For 0 < ǫ < 1, the ǫ-OT capacity of (X1,X2) is defined22 as
Cǫ(X1,X2) = lim
δ1,δ2→0
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
Lǫ,δ1,δ1(X
n
1 ,X
n
2 ).
Then, the OT capacity is defined as
C(X1,X2) = lim
ǫ→0
Cǫ(X1,X2).
The main result of this section is an upper bound on Lǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2). Consequently, we recover the
upper bound on C(X1,X2) due to Ahlswede and Csisza´r derived in [2]. In fact, we show that the upper
bound is “strong” and applies to Cǫ(X1,X2) for every 0 < ǫ < 1.
Heuristically, OT is feasible only when the observations of the two parties are correlated. However, no
party should have an advantage over the other, and only that portion of correlated randomness observed
by a party is useful which cannot be determined by the other party. Drawing on this heuristic, two
different bounds for OT length are possible, each based on relating OT length to “how far” the joint
distribution PX1X2 of the observed correlated randomness is from a useless distribution. The choice of
the useless distribution is different in both bounds. In the first bound, we consider a distribution such that
X1 and X2 are independent given V0 = mcf(X1,X2). For such distributions, once the shared knowledge
of each party is factored out, no correlation is available to facilitate OT. In the second bound, we consider
22For brevity, we use the same notation for SK capacity and OT capacity; the meaning will be clear from the context. Similarly,
the notation L, used here to denote the optimal OT length, is also used to denote the optimal BC length in the next section.
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distributions where V1 = mss(X2|X1) can be determined by X2. Note that for such distributions the
factorization PV1V1X2 = PV1|X2PV1|X2PX2 holds. Such distributions are useless for OT since the essential
part of X1 that is correlated with X2, namely V1, can be determined by X2, thereby giving an advantage
to Party 2. As in the case of SK agreement, we shall measure the distance between two distributions
using βǫ. In fact, our proof entails reducing SK agreement to OT; the reductions used for the two bounds
are different.
Theorem 13 (Single-shot bound for OT length). For RVs X1,X2, V0 = mcf(X1,X2) and V1 =
mss(X2|X1), the following inequalities hold:
Lǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) ≤ − log βη
(
PX1X2V0 ,PX1|V0PX2|V0PV0
)
+ 2 log(1/ξ), (36)
Lǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) ≤ − log βη
(
PV1V1X2 ,PV1|X2PV1|X2PX2
)
+ 2 log(1/ξ), (37)
for all ξ > 0 with η = ǫ+ δ1 + 2δ2 + ξ < 1.
Corollary 14 (Strong bound for OT capacity). For 0 < ǫ < 1, the ǫ-OT capacity of (X1,X2) satisfies
Cǫ(X1,X2) ≤ min{I(X1 ∧X2|V0), H(V1|X2)}, (38)
where V0 = mcf(X1,X2) and V1 = mss(X2|X1).
The proof of Theorem 13 entails reducing two SK agreement problems to OT23. The bound (36) is
obtained by recovering KB as a SK, while (37) is obtained by recovering KB as a SK; we note these
two reductions as separate lemmas below.
Lemma 15 (Reduction 1 of SK agreement to OT). Consider SK agreement for two parties observing
X1 and X2, respectively, with the eavesdropper observing V0 = mcf(X1,X2). Given a protocol realizing
an (ǫ, δ1, δ2)-OT of length l, there exists a protocol for generating an (ǫ+ δ1 + 2δ2)-SK of length l. In
particular,
Lǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) ≤ Sǫ+δ1+2δ2(X1,X2|V0).
Lemma 16 (Reduction 2 of SK agreement to OT). Consider two party SK agreement where Party 1
observes X1, Party 2 observes (V1,X2) = (mss(X2|X1),X2) and the eavesdropper observes X2. Given
a protocol realizing an (ǫ, δ1, δ2)-OT of length l, there exists a protocol for generating an (ǫ+δ1+2δ2)-SK
23A reduction of SK to OT in a computational secrecy setup appeared in [25].
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of length l. In particular,
Lǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) ≤ Sǫ+δ1+2δ2(X1, (V1,X2)|X2).
Remark 4. Underlying the proof of C(X1,X2) ≤ I(X1∧X2) in [2] was a reduction of SK agreement to
OT, which is extended in our proof below to prove (36). In contrast, the proof of the bound C(X1,X2) ≤
H(X1|X2) in [2] relied on manipulations of entropy terms. Below we give an alternative reduction
argument to prove (37).
Remark 5. In general, our bounds are stronger than those presented in [79]. For instance, the latter is
loose when the observations consist of mixtures of IID RVs. Further, while both (37) and [79, Theorem 5]
(specialized to OT) suffice to obtain the second bound in Corollary 14, in contrast to (36), [79, Theorem
2] does not yield the first bound in Corollary 14.
Remark 6. For simplicity of presentation, we did not allow local randomization in the formulation above.
However, it can be easily included as a part of X1 and X2 by replacing Xi with (Xi, Ui), i = 1, 2, where
U1, U2, (X1,X2) are mutually independent. Since our proofs are based on reduction of SK agreement
to OT, by noting that mss(X2, U2|X1, U1) = mss(X2|X1) and that the availability of local randomness
does not change our upper bound on SK length in Theorem 3, the results above remain valid even when
local randomness is available.
Remark 7. The (ǫ, δ1, δ2)-OT capacity Cǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) can be defined, without requiring δ1, δ2 to go
to 0 as in the definition of Cǫ(X1,X2). However, the right-side of (38) constitutes an upper bound
for Cǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) only when ǫ + δ1 + 2δ2 < 1, and establishing the validity of this bound for24
ǫ+ δ1 + 2δ2 ≥ 1 remains an open problem.
We prove Lemmas 15 and 16 next. The proof of Theorem 13 follows by Theorem 3, along with the
Markov relation X1—V1—X2 and the data processing inequality (5); the corollary follows by Stein’s
Lemma (see Section II-B).
Proof. of Lemma 15. Let Kˆ be the estimate of KB formed by Party 2. The following protocol generates
an (ǫ+ δ1 + 2δ2)-SK of length l
(i) Party 1 generates two random strings K0 and K1 of length l, and Party 2 generates a random bit
B. Two parties run the OT protocol, and Party 2 obtains an estimate Kˆ of KB .
(ii) Party 2 sends B over the public channel.
24For ǫ+δ1+δ2 ≥ 1, Cǫ,δ1,δ2(X1, X2) can be shown to be unbounded in the manner of the discussion preceding Corollary 12.
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(iii) Using B, Party 1 computes KB .
We will show that the RVs KB , Kˆ constitute an (ǫ+δ1+2δ2)-SK. The reliability for this SK is guaranteed
since both parties agree on KB with probability greater than 1 − ǫ. For establishing secrecy, note that
if Party 2 sends B instead of B, the eavesdropper cannot determine KB from (B,F) by the secrecy
condition for Party 1. On the other hand, by the secrecy condition for Party 2, the overall observation
(K0,K1,X1,F) of Party 1 has roughly the same distribution even when B is replaced by B. Thus, the
eavesdropper cannot determine KB from (B,F) as well.
Formally, by Proposition 1 and Remark 3, it suffices to show that for some distribution QV0FB (see
Remark 3),
d (PKBV0FB,Punif ×QV0FB) ≤ δ1 + 2δ2.
Observe that condition (35) is the same as
d
(
PK0K1X1F|B=0,PK0K1X1F|B=1
)
≤ 2δ2. (39)
Let QV0FB (v, f, b) = PV0F|B
(
v, f |b
)
PB (b). Then,
d (PKBV0FB ,Punif ×QV0FB)
=
1
2
∑
b
d
(
PKbV0F|B=b,Punif ×QV0F|B=b
)
=
1
2
∑
b
d
(
PKbV0F|B=b,Punif × PV0F|B=b
)
≤
1
2
∑
b
[
d
(
PKbV0F|B=b,Punif × PV0F|B=b
)
+ d
(
PKbV0F|B=b,PKbV0F|B=b
)]
= d
(
PKBV0FB ,Punif × PV0FB
)
+
1
2
∑
b
d
(
PKbV0F|B=b,PKbV0F|B=b
)
≤ δ1 + 2δ2,
where the last inequality uses (34) and (39), together with the fact that V0 is a function of X2 as well
as X1.
Proof. of Lemma 16. The following protocol generates an (ǫ+ δ1 + 2δ2)-SK of length l.
(i) Party 1 generates two random strings K0 and K1 of length l, and Party 2 generates a random bit
B. Two parties run the OT protocol.
(ii) Upon observing F, Party 2 samples X˜2 according to the distribution
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PX2|V1BF
(
·|V1, B,F
)
.
(iii) Party 2 sends B over the public channel.
(iv) Party 1 computes KB and Party 2 computes K˜ = Kˆ(X˜2, B,F).
We will show that the RVs KB , K˜ constitute an (ǫ+δ1+2δ2)-SK. Heuristically, this protocol entails Party
2 emulating X˜2, pretending that the protocol was executed for B instead of B. Since the communication
of Party 1 is oblivious of the value of B, plugging X˜2 into Kˆ will lead to an estimate of KB provided
that the emulated X˜2 preserves the joint distribution.
By Proposition 1 and (34), it suffices to show that
P
(
KB 6= K˜
)
≤ ǫ+ 2δ2. (40)
To that end, note
P
(
KB 6= K˜
)
=
1
2
∑
k, b, v,f
PKbV1F|B (k, v, f |b) P
(
Kˆ(X2, b, f) 6= k | V1 = v,B = b,F = f
)
≤
1
2
∑
k, b, v,f
PKbV1F|B
(
k, v, f |b
)
P
(
Kˆ(X2, b, f) 6= k | V1 = v,B = b,F = f
)
+ 2δ2
=
1
2
∑
k, b, v,f
PKbV1F|B (k, v, f |b) P
(
Kˆ(X2, b, f) 6= k | V1 = v,B = b,F = f
)
+ 2δ2
= P
(
KB 6= Kˆ
)
+ 2δ2.
where the inequality uses (39) and the last equality uses the Markov relation X2—V1BF—K0K1, which
holds in the view of the interactive communication property of Lemma 6; (40) follows by (33).
C. Bit commitment
Two parties observing correlated observations X1 and X2 want to implement information theoretically
secure BC using interactive public communication, i.e., the first party seeks to report to the second the
results of a series of coin tosses that it conducted at its end in such a manner that, at a later stage, Party 2
can detect if Party 1 was lying [7]. Formally, a BC protocol consists of two phases: the commit phase and
the reveal phase. In the commit phase, Party 1 generates a random string K, distributed uniformly over
{0, 1}l and independent jointly of (X1,X2). Furthermore, the two parties communicate interactively with
each other using an interactive communication F. In the reveal phase, Party 1 “reveals” its data, i.e., it
sends X ′1 and K ′, claiming these were its initial choices of X1 and K, respectively. Subsequently, Party
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2 applies a (randomized) test function T = T (K ′,X ′1,X2,F), where T = 0 and T = 1, respectively,
indicate K ′ = K and K ′ 6= K.
Definition 10 (Bit commitment). A protocol realizing an (ǫ, δ1, δ2)-BC of length l consists of an
interactive communication F to be sent during the commit phase and a {0, 1}-valued randomized test
function T to be used in the reveal phase such that the following conditions are satisfied:
P (T (K,X1,X2,F) 6= 0) ≤ ǫ, (41)
d (PKX2F,PK × PX2F) ≤ δ1, (42)
P
(
T (K ′,X ′1,X2,F) = 0,K
′ 6= K
)
≤ δ2, (43)
for any choice of RVs K ′ and X ′1 that have the same range-sets as K and X1, respectively25, and satisfy
(K ′,X ′1)—(K,X1,F)—X2.
The first condition above is the soundness condition, which captures the reliability of BC when Party 1 is
honest. The next condition is the hiding condition, which ensures that Party 2 cannot ascertain the secret
in the commit phase. Finally, the binding condition in (43) restricts the probability with which Party 1
can cheat in the reveal phase. Denote by Lǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) the largest l such that a protocol realizing an
(ǫ, δ1, δ2)-BC of length l exists.
For n-length IID sequences Xn1 ,Xn2 generated from PX1X2 , the largest rate of Lǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) is
called the BC capacity.
Definition 11 (BC capacity). For 0 < ǫ, δ1, δ2 < 1, the (ǫ, δ1, δ2)-BC capacity of (X1,X2) is defined as
Cǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) = lim infn→∞
1
n
Lǫ,δ1,δ2(X
n
1 ,X
n
2 ).
The BC capacity is defined as
C(X1,X2) = lim
ǫ,δ1,δ2→0
Cǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2).
The following result of Winter, Nascimento, and Imai [80] (see, also, [66, Chapter 8]) gives a simple
formula for C(X1,X2).
25Note that this restriction is valid since a dishonest Party 1 seeks to replace K with K′ in the reveal phase, without being
caught by Party 2.
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Theorem 17. [80] For RVs X1,X2, let V1 = mss(X2|X1). The BC capacity is given by
C(X1,X2) = H(V1|X2).
In this section, we present an upper bound on Lǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2), which in turn leads to a strong converse
for BC capacity.
Theorem 18 (Single-shot bound for BC length). Given 0 < ǫ, δ1, δ2, ǫ+ δ1 + δ2 < 1, for RVs X1,X2
and V1 = mss(X2|X1), the following inequality holds:
Lǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) ≤ − log βη
(
PV1V1X2 ,PV1|X2PV1|X2PX2
)
+ 2 log(1/ξ),
for all ξ with η = ǫ+ δ1 + δ2 + ξ.
Corollary 19 (Strong converse for BC capacity). For 0 < ǫ, δ1, δ2, ǫ+ δ1 + δ2 < 1, the (ǫ, δ1, δ2)-BC
capacity satisfies
Cǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) ≤ H(V1|X2),
where V1 = mss(X2|X1).
Theorem 18 is obtained by a reduction of SK agreement to BC, which is along the lines of [80], [33],
[56]; the following lemma captures the resulting bound.
Lemma 20 (Reduction of SK to BC). For 0 < ǫ, δ1, δ2, ǫ+ δ1 + δ2 < 1, it holds that
Lǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) ≤ Sǫ+δ1+δ2(X1, (V1,X2)|X2),
where V1 = mss(X2|X1).
Remark 8. While local randomization was not allowed in the foregoing discussion, as before (see Remark
6) our results do not change with the availability of local randomness.
Remark 9. For ǫ, δ1, δ2 > 0, ǫ + δ1 + δ2 < 1, the following bound on Lǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) was derived in
[56, Lemma 4]:
Lǫ,δ1,δ2(X1,X2) ≤
H(V1|X2) + h(δ1) + h(ǫ+ δ2)
1− ǫ− δ1 − δ2
,
where h(·) is the binary entropy function. However, this bound is weaker than Theorem 18, in general,
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and is not sufficient for deriving Corollary 19.
Theorem 18 follows by using Lemma 20 with Theorem 3, along with the Markov relation X1—V1—X2
and the data processing inequality (5); the Corollary 19 follows by Stein’s Lemma (see Section II-B).
We prove Lemma 20 below.
Proof of Lemma 20. The reduction argument presented here is along the lines of [33, Proposition 9]
(see, also, [56, Lemma 4]). Given an (ǫ, δ1, δ2)-BC of length l, consider SK agreement by two parties
observing X1 and (V1,X2), respectively, with the eavesdropper observing X2. To generate a SK, the
parties run the commit phase of the BC protocol, i.e., Party 1 generates K ∼ unif{0, 1}l and the parties
send the interactive communication F. We show that the committed secret K constitutes a (ǫ+ δ2, δ1)-
SK. Indeed, by the hiding condition (42), the SK K satisfies the secrecy condition (2) with δ = δ1. To
establish the reliability of this SK, we show that, roughly, K is the unique string which is compatible
with (V1,X2,F), namely that any other string will fail the test T , since otherwise a dishonest Party 1
can change the string in the reveal phase, contradicting the binding condition. Thus, Party 2 can obtain
an estimate of K by finding the unique string that is compatible with (V1,X2,F).
Formally, we complete the proof by showing that there exists Kˆ = Kˆ(V1,X2,F) such that
P
(
Kˆ 6= K
)
≤ ǫ+ δ2. (44)
To that end, let (kˆ, xˆ1) = (kˆ(v, f), xˆ1(v, f)) be a function of (v, f) given by
(kˆ, xˆ1) = argmax
k,x1
P (T (k, x1,X2,F) = 0 | V1 = v,F = f)
= argmax
k,x1
∑
x2
PX2|V1F (x2|v, f ) P (T (k, x1, x2, f) = 0) ,
and let (Kˆ, Xˆ1) = (kˆ(V1,F), xˆ1(V1,F)). Note that while the estimated secret Kˆ is a function of (v, f)
and does not depend on X2 directly, the latter is needed to facilitate the communication F in the emulation
September 13, 2018 DRAFT
36
of the commit phase. For (Kˆ, Xˆ1) as above, we get
P
(
T (Kˆ, Xˆ1,X2,F) = 0
)
=
∑
v,f
PV1F (v, f)
∑
x2
PX2|V1F (x2|v, f ) P
(
T (kˆ(v, f), xˆ1(v, f), x2, f) = 0
)
≥
∑
v,f
PV1F (v, f)
∑
k,x1
PK,X1|V1F (k, x1|v, f)
∑
x2
PX2|V1F (x2|v, f) P (T (k, x1, x2, f) = 0)
= P (T (K,X1,X2,F) = 0)
≥ 1− ǫ,
where the first inequality uses the definition of (kˆ(v, f), xˆ1(v, f)) and the second equality uses the Markov
relation KX1—V1F—X2, which holds in the view of the interactive communication property of Lemma
6. The inequality above, along with the binding condition (43), yields
1− ǫ ≤ P
(
Kˆ = K
)
+ P
(
T (Kˆ, Xˆ1,X2,F) = 0, Kˆ 6= K
)
≤ P
(
Kˆ = K
)
+ δ2,
which completes the proof of (44).
We conclude this section by observing a simple application of Theorem 18 in bounding the efficiency
of reduction of BC to OT. For a detailed discussion, see [56].
Example 1 (Reduction of BC to OT). Suppose two parties have at their disposal an OT of length n.
Using this as a resource, what is the length l of (ǫ, δ1, δ2)-BC that can be constructed?
Denoting by K0,K1 the OT strings, and by B the OT bit of Party 2, let X1 = (K0,K1) and X2 =
(B,KB). Note that (9) holds with P = PX1X1X2 and Q = PX1|X2PX1X2 , and
D(PX1X1X2‖PX1|X2PX1X2) = n.
Therefore, by Theorem 18 and (10), we get
l ≤ n+ log(1/(1 − ǫ− δ1 − δ2 − η)) + 2 log(1/η),
where 0 < η < 1− ǫ− δ1− δ2. This bound on efficiency of reduction is stronger than the one derived in
[56, Corollary 2] (fixing n = n′ = 1 in that bound). In particular, it shows an additive loss of logarithmic
order in (1− ǫ− δ1 − δ2), while [56, Corollary 2] shows a multiplicative loss of linear order.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURE COMPUTATION WITH TRUSTED PARTIES
In this section, we present a connection of our result to a problem of secure function computation with
trusted parties, where the parties seek to compute a function of their observations using a communication
that does not reveal the value of the function by itself (without the observations at the terminals). This
is in contrast to the secure computation treated in Section V where the communication is secure but the
parties are required not to get any more information than the computed function value. This problem was
introduced in [69] where a matching necessary and sufficient condition was given for the feasibility of
secure computation in the asymptotic case with IID observations. Here, using Theorem 3, we derive a
necessary condition for the feasibility of such secure computing for general observations (not necessarily
IID).
Formally, consider m ≥ 2 parties observing RVs X1, ...,Xm taking values in finite sets X1, ...,Xm,
respectively. Upon making these observations, the parties communicate interactively in order to securely
compute a function g : X1 × ...×Xm → G in the following sense: The ith party forms an estimate G(i)
of the function based on its observation Xi, local randomization Ui and interactive communication F,
i.e., G(i) = G(i)(Ui,Xi,F). For 0 ≤ ǫ, δ < 1, a function g is (ǫ, δ)-securely computable if there exists a
protocol satisfying
P
(
G = G(1) = · · · = G(m)
)
≥ 1− ǫ, (45)
d (PGF,PG × PF) ≤ δ, (46)
where G = g (XM). The first condition captures the reliability of computation and the second condition
ensures the secrecy of the protocol. Heuristically, for secrecy we require that an observer of (only) F
must not get to know the computed value of the function. We seek to characterize the (ǫ, δ)-securely
computable functions g.
In [69], an asymptotic version of this problem was addressed. The parties observe Xn1 , ...,Xnm and
seek to compute Gt = g (X1t, ...,Xmt) for each t ∈ {1, ..., n}; consequently, the RVs {Gt, 1 ≤ t ≤ n}
are IID. A function g is securely computable if the parties can form estimates G(n)(1) , ..., G
(n)
(m) such that
P
(
Gn = G
(n)
(1) = · · · = G
(n)
(m)
)
≥ 1− ǫn,
d (PGnF,PGn × PF) ≤ ǫn,
where lim
n→∞
ǫn = 0. The following characterization of securely computable functions g is known.
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Theorem 21. [69] For the asymptotic case described above, a function g is securely computable if
H(G) < C , where H(G) is the entropy of the RV G = g(XM) and C = C(XM) is the SK capacity
given in Theorem 11.
Conversely, if a function g is securely computable, then H(G) ≤ C .
Heuristically, the necessary condition above follows upon observing that if the parties can securely
compute the function g, then they can extract a SK of rate H(G) from RVs Gn. Therefore, H(G) must
be necessarily less than the maximum rate of a SK that can be generated, namely the SK capacity C .
Using this heuristic, we present a necessary condition for a function g to be (ǫ, δ)-securely computable.
Corollary 22. For 0 ≤ ǫ, δ < 1 with ǫ+ δ < 1, if a function g is (ǫ, δ)-securely computable, then
Hξmin(PG) ≤
1
|π| − 1
[
− log βµ
(
PXM ,Q
π
XM
)
+ |π| log(1/η)
]
+ 2 log(1/2ζ) + 1, ∀QπXM ∈ Q(π),
(47)
for every µ = ǫ+ δ + 2ξ + ζ + η with ξ, ζ, η > 0 such that µ < 1, and for every partition π of M.
Proof. The proof is based on extracting an ǫ-SK from the RV G that the parties share. Specifically,
Lemma 2 with X = G, Y = const, and condition (46) imply that there exists K = K(G) with
log |K| = ⌊Hξmin(PG)− 2 log(1/2ζ)⌋ and satisfying
d
(
PK(G)F,Punif × PF
)
≤ d
(
PK(G)F,PK(G) × PF
)
+ d
(
PK(G) × PF,Punif × PF
)
≤ d (PGF,PG × PF) + d
(
PK(G),Punif
)
≤ δ + 2ξ + ζ.
Thus, in the view of Proposition 1, the RV K constitutes26 an (ǫ + δ + 2ξ + ζ)-SK. An application of
Theorem 3 gives (47).
We conclude this section with two illustrative examples.
Example 2. (Computing functions of independent observations using a perfect SK). Suppose the ith
party observes Ui, where the RVs U1, ..., Um are mutually independent. Furthermore, all parties share
a κ-bit perfect SK K which is independent of UM. How many bits κ are required to (ǫ, δ)-securely
26Strictly speaking, the estimates K1, ..., Km of K formed by different parties constitute the (ǫ+ δ+2ξ+ ζ)-SK in the sense
of (3).
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compute a function g (U1, ..., Um)?
Note that the data observed by the ith party is given by Xi = (Ui,K). A simple calculation shows
that for every partition π of M,
βǫ

PXM ,
|π|∏
i=1
PXpii

 ≥ (1− ǫ)κ1−|π|,
and therefore, by Corollary 22 a necessary condition for g to be (ǫ, δ)-securely computable is
Hξmin(PG) ≤ κ+
1
|π| − 1
(|π| log(1/η) + log(1/(1 − µ))) + 2 log(1/2ζ) + 1, (48)
for every ξ, ζ, η > 0 satisfying µ = ǫ+ δ + 2ξ + ζ + η < 1. Note that the finest partition, i.e., |π| = m,
gives the tightest bound in (48).
For the special case when Ui = Bni , a sequence of independent, unbiased bits, and
g (Bn1 , ..., B
n
m) = B11 ⊕ ...⊕Bm1, ..., B1n ⊕ ...⊕Bmn,
i.e., the parties seek to compute the (element-wise) parities of the bit sequences, it holds that Hξmin(PG) ≥
n. Therefore, (ǫ, δ)-secure computation is feasible only if n ≤ κ+O(1). We remark that this necessary
condition is also (almost) sufficient. Indeed, if n ≤ κ, all but the mth party can reveal all their bits
Bn1 , . . . , B
n
m−1 and the mth party can send back Bn1 ⊕ . . .⊕Bnm ⊕Kn, where Kn denotes any n out of
κ bits of K. Clearly, this results in a secure computation of g.
Example 3. (Secure transmission). Two parties sharing a κ-bit perfect SK K seek to exchange a message
M securely.27 To this end, they communicate interactively using a communication F, and based on this
communication Party 2 forms an estimate Mˆ of the message M by Party 1. This protocol accomplishes
(ǫ, δ)-secure transmission if
P
(
M = Mˆ
)
≥ 1− ǫ,
d (PMF,PM × PF) ≤ δ.
The classic result of Shannon [62] implies that (0, 0)-secure transmission is feasible only if κ is at
least log ‖M‖, where ‖M‖ denotes the size of the message space.28 But, can we relax this constraint
for ǫ, δ > 0? In this example, we will give a necessary condition for the feasibility of (ǫ, δ)-secure
27A message M is a RV with known distribution PM .
28This is a slight generalization of Shannon’s original result; see [38, Theorem 2.7] for a proof.
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transmission by relating it to the previous example.
Specifically, let the observations of the two parties consist of X1 = (M,K), X2 = K. Then, (ǫ, δ)-
secure transmission of M is tantamount to securely computing the function g(X1,X2) = M . Therefore,
using (48), (ǫ, δ)-secure transmission of M is feasible only if
Hξmin(PM ) ≤ κ+ 2 log(1/η) + log(1/(1 − µ)) + 2 log(1/2ζ) + 1, (49)
for every ξ, ζ, η > 0 satisfying µ = ǫ+ δ + 2ξ + ζ + η < 1.
Condition (49) brings out a trade-off between κ and ǫ+ δ (cf. [38, Problems 2.12 and 2.13]). For an
illustration, consider a message M consisting of a RV Y taking values in a set Y = {0, 1}n ∪ {0, 1}2n
and with the following distribution:
PY (y) =


1
2 ·
1
2n y ∈ {0, 1}
n
1
2 ·
1
22n y ∈ {0, 1}
2n
.
For ǫ+ δ = 0, we know that secure transmission will require κ to be more than the worst-case message
length 2n. But perhaps by allowing ǫ + δ to be greater than 0, we can make do with fewer SK bits;
for instance, perhaps κ equal to H(M) = (3/2)n+ 1 will suffice (note that the average message length
equals (3/2)n). The necessary condition above says that this is not possible if ǫ + δ < 1/2. Indeed,
since Hξmin(PY ) ≥ 2n for ξ = 1/4, we get from (49) that the message M = Y can be (ǫ, δ)-securely
transmitted only if 2n ≤ κ+O(1), where the constant depends on ǫ and δ.
VII. DISCUSSION
In this work, we focused on converse results and presented single-shot upper bounds on the efficiency
of using correlated randomness for SK agreement and secure computation protocols. When the underlying
observations are IID, the resulting upper bounds were shown to be tight in several cases. It is natural
to ask how tight are these bounds for IID observations of fixed, finite length. For the SK agreement
problem, it is possible to mimic the approach in [44], [1], [16], [60] to obtain protocols that first use
communication for information reconciliation and then extract SKs using privacy amplification. The
challenge in the multiparty setup is to identify the appropriate information to be reconciled. For the case
of two parties observing IID sequences, relying on Theorem 3, recently the second-order asymptotic term
in the maximum length of a SK was established in [29], [30]. Coming up with finite-length schemes
that match the converse bounds for the various secure computation problems studied above is work in
progress.
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Our converse results in Sections V and VI entail reducing SK agreement to the secure computation
task at hand, followed by an application of Theorem 3. The strength of Theorem 3 lies in its validity
for interactive communication. The admissibility of interactive communication makes this bound useful
in cryptography where interaction is natural to consider, and it is foreseeable, and indeed tempting,
that this approach can lead to converse bounds for other problems in information theoretic secrecy and
cryptography; an instance arises in [31].
In fact, our bound can find applications in problems involving interactive communication without any
secrecy requirements. For instance, it is used in [71] to derive a lower bound for the length of the
interactive communication needed for two parties to exchange their correlated data. Furthermore, it is
used in [70] to derive a lower bound on the communication complexity for simulating protocols.
Note that similar to [52], [28] the choice of Q in Theorem 3 is arbitrary. In the applications to
capacity results considered in this paper and in deriving the second-order asymptotics for the two party
SK agreement problem in [29], Q equal to the product of marginals of P suffices. However, in a more
involved application of Theorem 3, such as that in [71], [70], a judicious choice of Q is needed.
A quantum version of the two party secret key agreement problem of [44], [1] has been considered in
[19], [11]. An extension of Theorem 3 to the case of quantum observations can be used to obtain converse
results for such problems. In the classical case, for two parties with IID observations, Theorem 3 shows
that the (ǫ, δ)-SK capacity is bounded above by
min
QX1|ZQX2|ZQZ
D(PX1X2Z‖QX1|XQX2|ZQZ) = I(X1 ∧X2|Z), (50)
where the equality follows from the Topsøe identity [65]. On the other hand, in the quantum case, the
identity (50) does not hold [32]. Thus, a direct extension of Theorem 3 to quantum observations will
not yield the quantum conditional mutual information bound for SK capacity derived in [11]. Finding an
appropriate extension of Theorem 3 to the case of quantum observations is an interesting direction for
future research.
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